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Abstract: Confabulation—fabricated or distorted memories about
oneself—occurs in many disorders, but there is no reliable technique
for investigating it in the laboratory. The authors used hypnosis to
model clinical confabulation by giving subjects a suggestion for either
(a) amnesia for everything that had happened since they started
university, (b) amnesia for university plus an instruction to fill in
memory gaps, or (c) confusion about the temporal order of uni-
versity events. They then indexed different types of memory on a
confabulation battery. The amnesia suggestion produced the most
confabulation, especially for personal semantic information. Notably,
subjects confabulated by making temporal confusions. The authors
discuss the theoretical implications of this first attempt to model
clinical confabulation and the potential utility of such analogues.
Clinical confabulation involves the “production of fabricated, dis-
torted, or misinterpreted memories about oneself or the world, without
the conscious intention to deceive” (Fotopoulou, Conway, Griffiths,
Birchall, & Tyrer, 2007, p. 6). To illustrate the lack of insight that
confabulators have about their memory deficits, Moscovitch (1989)
coined the term honest lying to describe this pathological form of mem-
ory. Confabulation, which typically occurs in the context of amnesia, is
seen across a range of neuropsychological and psychiatric conditions—
including schizophrenia, Korsakoff’s syndrome, dementia—and fol-
lowing traumatic brain injury (see Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart,
2007, for a summary). However, experimental investigation of clin-
ical confabulation has proven difficult, because patients often have
other symptoms and cognitive impairments. In this article, we sug-
gest that hypnosis may offer an innovative technique for re-creating
clinical confabulation in the laboratory. This use of hypnosis has been
described as a way of creating “virtual patients” (Cox & Barnier,
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2013; Oakley & Halligan, 2009; see also Woody & Szechtman, 2011)
as it allows us to temporarily model clinical phenomena in otherwise
healthy individuals.
Confabulation typically occurs in the context of amnesia (e.g., fol-
lowing traumatic brain injury; Kopelman, 2010), but its content can
vary. For instance, confabulation may involve bizarre descriptions of
clearly false events, such as patient GN who reported that he went to
a party and met a woman with the head of a bee (Turner, Cipolotti,
& Shallice, 2010). However, the term also has been used to describe
milder memory errors, distortions, and embellishments (see Gilboa
& Verfaellie, 2010, for a summary). For example, consider the case
of patient AP (reported by Metcalf, 2005), a 51-year-old male who
began to confabulate after sustaining a brain injury due to severe
lack of oxygen. The following transcript illustrates the nature of AP’s
confabulation:
Examiner: Tell me about what you would do on a typical Tuesday before you
came to this hospital.
AP: Usual Tuesday would be a school day.
Examiner: A school day?
AP: Yeah, I go to school.
Examiner: And what would you do at school?
AP: Just whatever subjects I’ve got today. Maths, science, English.
(Metcalf, 2005, p.96)
These confabulations are strikingly different to GN’s. The content
is nonbizarre (even if it is bizarre that a 51-year-old man claims to
be going to school), and they seem to reflect confusion about time
and place. Given these quite different manifestations of confabulation,
there is ongoing debate about how confabulation should be classi-
fied. Distinctions have been made between momentary confabulation
(true events occasionally misplaced in time and context) and fantastic
confabulation (bizarre, long-standing fabrications; Berlyne, 1972) and
between spontaneous confabulation (which occurs without prompting,
is often acted upon and is seen in cases of amnesia and frontal lobe
pathology) and provoked confabulation (seen as a normal attempt at
filling in memory gaps; Kopelman, 1987). But these distinctions cannot
classify all types of confabulators, and many researchers prefer to view
confabulation as a continuum ranging from mild-to-severe memory dis-
tortions (Dalla Barba, 1993b). Further complexity exists when we con-
sider the overlap between confabulation and delusion. Both are patho-
logical forms of false belief and memory that are resistant to rational
counterargument. Whereas some researchers argue that confabulation
is a form of delusion (Berrios, 2000), others argue that confabulations
and delusions are distinct pathologies (e.g., memory-related vs. belief-
related), demanding different explanations and treatments (Kopelman,































There are multiple views of confabulation, especially surrounding
its definition and subtypes. Many of these views explain confabulation
in terms of memory production (i.e., what causes the confabulation
to arise in the first place; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997) and memory
evaluation/monitoring (i.e., what processes are responsible for the
maintenance and acceptance of the confabulation; Johnson, Hashtroudi,
& Lindsay, 1993; Metcalf et al., 2007). We briefly outline four of these
views.
According to the first broad view, confabulation involves disrup-
tions in strategic retrieval of experienced events (Kopelman, 1999;
Moscovitch, 1989; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). Strategic memory pro-
cesses operate to initiate, to guide, and to constrain a memory search
(e.g., elaborating upon a retrieval cue or checking that the memory
obtained is plausible). Confabulation occurs when these strategic pro-
cesses are disrupted. This might result, for example, in a failure to
search for an appropriate memory (influencing memory production)
or a failure to successfully evaluate memories that are accessed (influ-
encing memory monitoring). According to this view, confabulators
should display both semantic (generic, context-free factual knowledge)
and episodic (personally experienced events) confabulation, because
disrupted strategic memory processes should influence both types of
memory (Metcalf et al., 2007). However, there are cases of purely
episodic confabulation that cannot be sufficiently explained by strate-
gic deficit accounts (Dalla Barba, 1993a; Dalla Barba, Cipolotti, & Denes,
1990; Metcalf et al., 2007).
According to the second broad view, confabulation involves tempo-
ral confusion where experienced events are misplaced in time and/or
context (Dalla Barba, 1993a, 1999; Dalla Barba, Cappelletti, Signorini,
& Denes, 1997; Schnider, 2008; Schnider & Ptak, 1999). Confabulation
occurs when previously experienced events intrude into the present
(influencing memory production). This may arise due to problems fil-
tering out irrelevant information from ongoing reality. However, some
researchers (e.g., Moscovitch, 1995) argue that temporal confusion is
just one symptom of confabulation and cannot account for more bizarre
confabulation (e.g., patient GN who reported meeting a woman with
the head of a bee; Turner et al., 2010). Others argue that temporal con-
fusion lacks a disrupted memory evaluation/monitoring component,
which is critical to fully explain confabulation (Gilboa & Moscovitch,
2002; Metcalf et al., 2007).
According to the third broad view, confabulation involves poor
reality and source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye,
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determining the temporal relevance of memories but also have
difficulty distinguishing between real memories and information from
other sources (e.g., imaginings, thoughts, or dreams). Consequently,
events that have never been experienced may be misattributed as
real since evaluation deficits result in the uncritical acceptance of
information as veridical (Johnson, O’Connor, & Cantor, 1997). Source-
monitoring views can account for confabulation with bizarre content,
since these confabulations may have their origins in imagination.
However, Dalla Barba (1993b) argued against this view, stating that if
confabulators had a source-monitoring deficit, they should make source
errors on both episodic and semantic memory tasks (i.e., any task that
requires a judgment about the source of a memory). Yet, as noted above,
there are cases of purely episodic confabulation. Further, there is evi-
dence that confabulators and nonconfabulating amnesics often perform
similarly on source-monitoring tasks (Metcalf et al., 2007).
Finally, a fourth view combines elements of the strategic deficit
account and elements of the source-monitoring account (Metcalf et al.,
2007; Turner & Coltheart, 2010). According to this view, there are two
factors that combine to produce confabulation (based on Langdon and
Coltheart’s two-factor theory of delusions; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000;
see also Coltheart, 2007). The first factor, which explains the produc-
tion of the confabulation, is the impaired retrieval of information from
the autobiographical knowledge base. Retrieval is impaired because
patients have difficulty using source and contextual information to
bind memory fragments into coherent memories. In addition to this
Factor 1 impairment, the specific content of confabulation can be influ-
enced by motivation, personal biases, identity, and the goals of the
self (see also Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway & Tacchi, 1996;
Fotopoulou, 2010; Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2010). The second fac-
tor, which explains why the confabulation is not rejected as untrue, is
impaired evaluation of this information. This involves impairment to
thought/memory-checking processes. Turner and Coltheart (2010) sug-
gested that in normal memory retrieval, there is an unconscious process,
whereby memories that require extra conscious checking are tagged
and associated with a feeling of doubt. They suggested that in confab-
ulating patients this unconscious checking system fails. Consequently,
thoughts and memories are never doubted and are thus never checked
by the conscious checking system.
In summary, there is ongoing debate around definitions, classifi-
cation, and theories of confabulation. This may be due in part to
the variety of clinical conditions that feature confabulation. Although
amnesia is common in confabulation, some patients have neurologi-
cal deficits (e.g., due to traumatic brain injury) whereas others have
psychiatric disorders (e.g., schizophrenia). Also, many patients have






























their performance on information processing and memory-related tasks
designed to examine confabulation. A further challenge is that there are
no viable experimental methods for investigating clinical confabulation
in the laboratory that can control for this variety of clinical condi-
tions and impairments. However, in this study, we aimed to develop
a new technique to experimentally investigate clinical confabulation
using hypnosis.
Note that the type of clinical confabulation we aimed to model is
distinct from the large body of literature on hypnotic confabulation,
which is forensically driven (e.g., Laurence & Perry, 1983, 1988; Lynn
& McConkey, 1998; McConkey, 1992; McConkey, Barnier, & Sheehan,
1998; Spanos & McLean, 1986). This existing literature on hypnotic
confabulation typically does not involve an explicit suggestion for
amnesia (which is a core component of clinical confabulation) but
instead investigates the impact of leading questions and implanting
pseudomemories, sometimes in the absence of complete memory (for
a review, see McConkey et al., 1998).
Using Hypnosis to Study Clinical Confabulation
Creating hypnotic analogues of clinical conditions allows researchers
to temporarily disrupt memory and information processing. Specific
hypnotic suggestions can target aspects of information processing that
may be involved in confabulation, and the hypnotic context can disrupt
the normal evaluation of this information (Cox & Barnier, 2010, 2013;
Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988; Oakley & Halligan, 2009; Woody & Szechtman,
2011). Thus, hypnosis may offer a way to model clinical confabulation
in the laboratory.
There is an extensive literature from the last 30 years on the “instru-
mental” use of hypnosis to model a range of psychopathologies includ-
ing delusions (e.g., Attewell, Cox, Barnier, & Langdon, 2012; Barnier
et al., 2008; Cox & Barnier, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013; Freeman, Cox, &
Barnier, 2013; Rahmanovic, Barnier, Cox, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2012)
and disorders of memory such as functional amnesia (e.g., Barnier, 2002;
Cox & Barnier, 2003), and déjà vu (e.g., O’Connor, Barnier, & Cox, 2008).
There is substantial evidence that hypnosis can closely map the features
of these clinical conditions. For instance, in research that used hypno-
sis to model mirrored-self misidentification delusion (the belief that I
see a stranger, not me, when I look in the mirror), we attempted to
produce the delusional belief by suggesting that subjects would see a
stranger when they looked in the mirror (Barnier et al., 2008; see also
Barnier, Cox, Connors, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2011; Bortolotti, Cox,
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Connors, Cox, Barnier, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2012). High hypnotizable
subjects reported seeing a stranger in the mirror with physical charac-
teristics different to their own. They often claimed that the “stranger”
was copying their actions, and some even looked around the room to
find the stranger.
We also have used hypnosis to model erotomania (Attewell et al.,
2012), which is the delusional belief that one is loved from afar by
another person (the target). Following a hypnotic erotomania sugges-
tion, we read subjects a story involving themselves and the target
and later asked them to recall the story as well as respond to chal-
lenges to the delusion. High hypnotizable subjects confabulated in
their story recall, describing specific, detailed interactions between
themselves and the target. Later, they used these confabulations to
support and maintain their delusion when challenged. This and other
research shows that hypnotic suggestions can create compelling—but
temporary—disruptions in basic cognitive processes (e.g., perception,
action, memory) similar to those argued to be involved in clinical
confabulation.
The Current Study
We felt confident that hypnosis could model clinical confabulation,
because hypnotic suggestions can produce amnesia, which often occurs
in the context of confabulation. Suggestions for posthypnotic amnesia
(PHA) are included in many standardized scales of hypnotizability,
such as the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form
A (HGSHS:A; Shor & Orne, 1962) and the Stanford Hypnotic
Susceptibility Scale, Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962).
These suggestions typically involve an instruction to forget the events of
hypnosis until a reversibility cue is administered. Posthypnotic amnesia
is readily experienced by high hypnotizable individuals who consti-
tute approximately 10–15% of the population (Barnier & McConkey,
2004). Most important, hypnotic suggestions also have been used to
successfully create amnesia for personal, autobiographical events. For
instance, Barnier (2002) demonstrated that PHA for autobiographical
events shares many features with functional amnesia (amnesia not due
to brain injury or disease; Schacter & Kihlstrom, 1989). Barnier (2002)
gave high and low hypnotizable subjects (hereafter referred to as highs
and lows) a PHA suggestion to forget their first day of high school and
their first day of university. Following hypnosis, she found that highs
had difficulty recalling the personal semantic and autobiographical
details associated with these events. For highs, both memory speci-






























recovered their memories of these events following the reversibility cue.
Thus, the PHA suggestion temporarily limited highs’ accessibility to
both personal semantic information and autobiographical events. This
suggests that hypnotic suggestions may also be able to reproduce the
type of personal forgetting seen in clinical confabulation (see also Cox
& Barnier, 2003).
The aim of this study was to create a viable hypnotic analogue of clin-
ical confabulation. We based our study on Metcalf et al.’s (2010) sugges-
tion that two factors combine to produce confabulation. The first factor
involves disrupted memory production, and the second factor involves
impaired memory evaluation/monitoring. We attempted to model the
disrupted production component by developing three different hyp-
notic suggestions. Each suggestion was designed to shape the clinical
expression of confabulation in a different way. We attempted to model
the impaired evaluation/monitoring component of confabulation by
giving these suggestions in the hypnotic context (which is known to dis-
rupt belief evaluation and reality monitoring; Bryant & Mallard, 2005).
This was also inspired by our work on mirrored-self misidentification
delusion (Connors, Barnier, et al., 2012), where we found that sugges-
tions administered during hypnosis produced the delusion, whereas
the same suggestions administered in the nonhypnotic state did not.
In the first suggestion (amnesia suggestion), we attempted to impair
memory production by giving subjects a suggestion for amnesia alone,
since amnesia commonly occurs in clinical confabulation. We told sub-
jects that they would not be able to remember anything that had
happened since they started university. Here, we were interested in
whether amnesia alone in the context of hypnosis might lead to unsug-
gested confabulation. In the second suggestion (fill-in-gaps suggestion),
we attempted to impair memory production by giving subjects a sug-
gestion for amnesia plus a suggestion to fill in any gaps in memory.
We told subjects that they would not be able to remember anything
that had happened since they started university and they should fill
in the gaps in their memory. Here, we were interested in how subjects
would fill in these memory gaps. For instance, they might completely
fabricate information or they might draw upon previous experiences.
In the third suggestion (temporal-confusion suggestion), we attempted to
impair memory production by giving subjects a suggestion to disrupt
the temporal order of events. We told subjects that they would not be
able to remember the exact order of events that have happened since
they started university, and that they would mix up these events and
recall them out of order. Here, we were interested in whether subjects
would generate confabulations that involved previously experienced
events misplaced in time. In all three conditions, we gave subjects an
instruction to forget the hypnotist’s suggestion because we wanted
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hypnotic suggestion) similar to clinical patients who might lack insight
into their condition (for a similar strategy, see Zimbardo, Andersen, &
Kabat, 1981).
To test the impact of each suggestion, we administered a modi-
fied version of Dalla Barba’s (1993a) Confabulation Battery (based on
Metcalf et al., 2007). This included questions about personal seman-
tic memory, personal episodic memory, and questions to which the
answers should be “I don’t know” (e.g., “What did you have for lunch
on March 20th of this year?”). Half of the questions focused on uni-
versity events (targeted by the suggestion) and half focused on school
events. After cancelling the suggestion and after hypnosis, we read
the confabulation battery back to subjects, reminded them of their
responses and asked them about the veracity of each response to deter-
mine whether they had confabulated. If subjects indicated that their
responses on the confabulation battery were inaccurate, we asked them
about the source of these confabulations.
We hypothesized that highs would confabulate more than lows,
especially in response to university events. We expected that highs in
the fill-in-gaps condition would confabulate the most in response to
personal semantic, episodic, and “I don’t know” questions, since this
suggestion encourages responding even though an appropriate mem-
ory might not be available due to amnesia. We expected highs in the
temporal-confusion condition to recall previously experienced events in
an altered temporal sequence rather than completely fabricate events.
Finally, we wondered if highs in the amnesia condition would confab-




We tested 24 (3 males, 21 females) high hypnotizable subjects of
mean age 21.58 years (SD = 4.32) and 16 low hypnotizable subjects
(6 males, 10 females) of mean age 20.25 years (SD = 3.30) in a 2
(Hypnotizability: high vs. low) × 3 (Suggestion Condition: amnesia vs.
fill in gaps vs. temporal confusion) between-subjects design. Subjects
were undergraduate psychology students at Macquarie University who
received credit toward their psychology course or $20 remuneration for
their involvement. We carefully selected subjects on the basis of their
scores on a modified 10-item version of the HGSHS:A and a modified
11-item version of the SHSS:C.1 Highs scored 7–10 (M = 7.96, SD =
1The 10-item modified HGSHS:A included: head falling, eye closure, hand lower-
ing, finger lock, moving hands together, communication inhibition, experiencing of fly,






























0.88) on the HGSHS:A and 7–11 (M = 8.42, SD = 1.25) on the SHSS:C.
Lows scored 0–3 (M = 2.16, SD = 1.00) on the HGSHS:A and 0–3 (M =
1.87, SD = 1.09) on the SHSS:C.
Procedure
We tested subjects individually in 1.5-hour sessions, which involved
a hypnosis session and a postexperimental inquiry. Both the hypnosis
session and the inquiry were conducted by the same experimenter.
Hypnosis session. Following informed consent procedures, the hyp-
notist administered the SHSS:C induction and the first 10 SHSS:C
suggestions. Next, she randomly assigned subjects to either the amnesia
condition (n = 13), the fill-in-gaps condition (n = 14), or the temporal-
confusion condition (n = 13). The verbatim suggestions for each condi-
tion were the following:
Amnesia suggestion:
Continue to remain comfortably relaxed and deeply hypnotized but lis-
ten carefully to what I say next. I would now like you to forget
everything that has happened to you since you started university.
That’s right. I want you to completely forget everything that has hap-
pened to you since you started university. You will still be able to
remember the events that happened before university but you will
have no memory at all for anything that has happened since you
started university. You will be unable to remember the events that
have occurred since you started university and you will prefer not to
try. It will be much easier just to forget everything that has happened
since you started university until I tell you that you can remember.
This will happen until I say, “Now you can remember everything.”
So you will completely forget everything that has happened since you
started university. Do you understand? You will continue to experi-
ence this change in your memory — that is, you will not be able to
remember anything that has happened since you started university —
but you will not be aware that I gave you this instruction. A little later I
will ask you about some events from your life. When answering these
questions, you will not be able to remember anything that has hap-
pened since you started university. And you will not realize that this
is because I gave you an instruction to forget during hypnosis. Do you
understand?
immobilization items were removed to ensure that the procedure could be conducted
within the time limits of a 1-hour session. The 11-item modified SHSS:C included: hand
lowering, moving hands apart, mosquito hallucination, taste hallucination, arm rigidity,
dream, age regression, arm immobilization, anosmia, negative visual hallucination, and
posthypnotic amnesia; the auditory hallucination item was removed and the procedure
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Fill-in-gaps suggestion:
Continue to remain comfortably relaxed and deeply hypnotized but lis-
ten carefully to what I say next. I would now like you to forget
everything that has happened to you since you started university.
That’s right. I want you to completely forget everything that has hap-
pened to you since you started university. You will still be able to
remember the events that happened before university but you will
have no memory at all for anything that has happened since you
started university. You will be unable to remember the events that
have occurred since you started university and you will prefer not to
try. It will be much easier just to forget everything that has happened
since you started university until I tell you that you can remember.
This will happen until I say, “Now you can remember everything.”
So you will completely forget everything that has happened since you
started university. Do you understand? You will continue to experi-
ence this change in your memory — that is, you will not be able to
remember anything that has happened since you started university —
but you will not be aware that I gave you this instruction. However,
you will fill in the gaps in your memory. A little later I will ask you
about some events from your life. When answering these questions,
you will not be able to remember anything that has happened since
you started university. And you will not realize that this is because I
gave you an instruction to forget during hypnosis. However, you will
fill in the gaps in your memory so you can answer these questions.
Do you understand?
Temporal-confusion suggestion:
Continue to remain comfortably relaxed and deeply hypnotized but lis-
ten carefully to what I say next. I would now like you to forget the
exact order of events that have happened to you since you started
university. That’s right. I want you to completely forget the correct
order of events that have happened since you started university. You
will still be able to remember the order of events that happened before
university but you will have no memory for the exact order of events
that have happened since you started university. You will be unable
to remember the order of events that have occurred since you started
university and you will prefer not to try. It will be much easier just to
forget the order of events that have happened since you started uni-
versity until I tell you that you can remember. This will happen until
I say, “Now you can remember everything.” So you will completely
forget the correct order of events that have happened since you started
university. Do you understand? You will continue to experience this
change in your memory — that is, you will not be able to remember
the correct order of events that have happened since you started uni-
versity — but you will not be aware that I gave you this instruction.
However, you will mix up the order of these events and recall them
out of order. So, you will be unable to recall exactly when things hap-






























later I will ask you about some events from your life. When answering
these questions, you will recall events that have happened since you
started university out of order. And you will not realize that this is
because I gave you an instruction to do this during hypnosis. Do you
understand?
The hypnotist then gave all subjects a deepening suggestion, where she
counted from 1 to 5 while instructing subjects to become more deeply
hypnotized.
Confabulation Battery. To test the impact of the suggestion, the hyp-
notist asked subjects to complete a modified version of Dalla Barba’s
(1993a) Confabulation Battery. This consisted of six questions index-
ing personal semantic memory (three questions about university, e.g.,
“Which year did you start university?”; three questions about school,
e.g., “What high school did you go to?”), six questions indexing per-
sonal episodic memory (three questions about university, e.g., “How
did you spend your first day at university?”; three questions about
school, e.g., “Tell me about a birthday party you went to during high
school”), and six questions to which the answers should be “I don’t
know” (three questions about university e.g., “What did you have for
lunch on March 20th of this year?”; three questions about school, e.g.,
“What did you do on March 13th when you were in Year 8?”). The
complete confabulation battery is in the Appendix.
Next, the hypnotist cancelled the confabulation suggestion and
administered the SHSS:C deinduction (including the posthypnotic
amnesia suggestion; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). She then tested
and cancelled the SHSS:C posthypnotic amnesia suggestion before
proceeding to the postexperimental inquiry.
Postexperimental inquiry. In the postexperimental inquiry, the hyp-
notist asked subjects to describe their experience of completing the
Confabulation Battery, especially for university events. The hypnotist
then reminded subjects of each question and the responses they had
provided and asked them whether each response had been correct.
If subjects indicated that any of their responses had been incorrect, they
were asked, “Where did that incorrect information come from?” To con-
clude the session, the hypnotist debriefed subjects, invited them to ask
questions and thanked them for their time.
Results
Questions Answered
Analyses first examined the number of questions answered (whether
































































































































































































































































































































































































these data according to hypnotizability, suggestion condition, ques-
tion type, and time period. For personal semantic questions, a 2
(Hypnotizability: high vs. low) × 3 (Suggestion Condition: amnesia vs.
fill in gaps vs. temporal confusion) × 2 (Time Period: university vs.
school) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the number of answers yielded
a significant main effect of Hypnotizability, F(1, 34) = 7.69, p < .01, β =
.18. Lows answered more personal semantic questions (M = 6.00, SD =
0.00) than highs (M = 5.54, SD = 0.66), although both highs and lows
answered all or almost all questions (max. number of answers = 6).
For episodic questions, a 2 (Hypnotizability) × 3 (Suggestion
Condition) × 2 (Time Period) ANOVA of the number of answers yielded
a significant main effect of time period, F(1, 34) = 12.03, p < .01, β = 0.26.
Subjects answered more episodic questions about school events (M =
2.85, SD = 0.36) than about university events (M = 2.25, SD = 0.98).
There also was a significant main effect of Hypnotizability, F(1, 34) =
5.02, p = .03, β = 0.13. Lows answered more episodic questions (M =
5.44, SD = 0.81) than highs (M = 4.88, SD = 1.15). Finally, there was
a significant main effect of Suggestion Condition, F(2, 34) = 13.69, p <
.01, β = 0.45. A follow-up one-way ANOVA with post hoc Scheffe com-
parisons (controlling Type I error at p = .05/3) revealed that subjects
in the amnesia condition answered fewer questions (M = 4.15, SD =
0.99) than subjects in the temporal-confusion condition (M = 5.85, SD =
0.38), p < .01, and fewer questions than those in the fill-in-gaps condi-
tion (M = 5.29, SD = 0.91), p < .01. There was no difference between the
temporal-confusion and fill-in-gaps conditions.
For “I don’t know” questions, a 2 (Hypnotizability) × 3 (Suggestion
Condition) × 2 (Time Period) ANOVA of the number of answers yielded
a significant interaction between Hypnotizability and Suggestion
Condition, F(2, 34) = 4.45, p = .02, β = 0.21. However, two sepa-
rate follow-up one-way ANOVAs with post hoc Scheffe comparisons
(controlling Type I error at p = .05/3) revealed no significant effects.
A detailed examination of subjects’ responses indicated that both highs
and lows in all suggestion conditions were willing to respond to these
questions by saying “I don’t know.”
As expected, in terms of the number of questions answered, the
confabulation suggestion impaired memory for university events tar-
geted by the suggestion, influenced highs more so than lows, and the
amnesia version of the suggestion produced the most forgetting.
Questions Confabulated
Subjects were scored as confabulating if they indicated to the hyp-
notist in the postexperimental inquiry that they had provided incorrect
responses on the Confabulation Battery (e.g., fabricated memories, con-
fused memories in time and/or place). Also, all responses to “I don’t


































































































































































































































































































































































































data for personal semantic, episodic, and “I don’t know” questions
according to hypnotizability, suggestion condition, question type, and
time period. As indicated in Table 2, the total number of self-reported
confabulations was generally quite low (highs M = 2.42, SD = 2.41;
lows M = 0.75, SD = 0.93). Further, subjects rarely confabulated in
response to high school events (M = 0.58, SD = 0.78), which is to be
expected since the confabulation suggestions did not target this time
period. Thus, in the following analyses, we only consider confabulation
in response to university events.
For personal semantic questions, a 2 (Hypnotizability) × 3
(Suggestion Condition) between-subjects ANOVA of the number of
confabulations yielded a significant main effect of Hypnotizability, F(1,
34) = 6.62, p = .02, β = 0.16. Highs confabulated in response to personal
semantic questions (M = 0.79, SD = 1.10) more than lows (M = 0.13,
SD = 0.34). There also was a near-significant main effect of Suggestion
Condition, F(2, 34) = 3.05, p = .06, β = 0.15. A separate follow-up
one-way ANOVA with post hoc Scheffe comparisons (controlling Type
I error at .05/3) approached significance, suggesting that the amnesia
suggestion tended to produce more confabulation (M = 0.85, SD =
1.28) than the temporal confusion suggestion (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00),
p = .06.
For episodic questions, a 2 (Hypnotizability) × 3 (Suggestion
Condition) between-subjects ANOVA of the number of confabulations
yielded no significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .15).
Similarly, for “I don’t know” questions, a 2 (Hypnotizability) × 3
(Suggestion Condition) between-subjects ANOVA of the number of
confabulations yielded no significant main effects or interactions (all ps
> .09). Thus, the confabulation suggestion did not appear to influence
episodic memory or responses to “I don’t know” questions.
Summary
As expected, the amnesia suggestion was successful at producing
the most forgetting. Subjects forgot more information from university
than school and highs experienced more forgetting than lows. When
we examined confabulation, we found that subjects did not confabu-
late about high school events. However, for university events, subjects
confabulated on questions indexing personal semantic information
rather than episodic questions or “I don’t know” questions. For these
personal semantic questions, highs confabulated more than lows and
the amnesia suggestion tended to produce more confabulation than the
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to create a hypnotic analogue of clinical
confabulation. We developed three hypnotic confabulation suggestions
inspired by three theoretical views about the nature of confabulation.
We perceived these three suggestions as three potential Factor 1s—
amnesia, fill in gaps, and temporal confusion—and we considered whether
the hypnotic context, which is known to disrupt critical evaluation
(Bryant & Mallard, 2005), might play the role of Factor 2. Within this
framework, we hoped that Factor 1 and Factor 2 would combine to
produce confabulations similar to those seen in clinical contexts.
First, we demonstrated that the suggestion for amnesia alone was
successful in producing forgetting. When we examined the number of
questions answered, we found that subjects who received the amnesia
suggestion answered fewer questions, especially about episodic events.
The target time period for our amnesia suggestion involved events that
occurred since subjects started university. Targeting amnesia in this way
was successful since subjects answered fewer questions about univer-
sity compared to high school. The amnesia suggestion encompassed
what Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) labeled a lifetime period in their
hierarchical model of autobiographical remembering. According to this
model, lifetime periods have identifiable beginnings and ends and often
involve a theme (e.g., “the time I worked at X,” “when I lived in Y”).
Forgetting entire lifetime periods, as required by those in the amnesia
condition, may be easier than more specific types of forgetting (e.g., for-
getting the temporal order of events). Indeed, in previous work (Cox &
Barnier, 2003), we found that high hypnotizable individuals were more
successful in forgetting their entire first romantic relationship (a life-
time period) than they were in forgetting selected events that occurred
during this relationship. These findings suggest that for subjects in the
amnesia condition, we successfully created a potential Factor 1.
Second, we demonstrated that for high hypnotizable individuals,
hypnotic suggestions can produce confabulations similar to those seen
in clinical settings. Although the total amount of confabulation was rel-
atively low, the proportion of confabulations made by highs on our
18-item Confabulation Battery was 13%, which is consistent with pro-
portions seen in some clinical populations. For example, La Corte,
Serra, Attali, Boissé, and Dalla Barba (2010) found that the proportion
of confabulations made by a group of patients with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease and confabulating amnesics on a 165-item Confabulation Battery
was 14%. Similarly, Kessels, Kortrijk, Wester, and Nys (2008) found
that the proportion of confabulations made by Korsakoff patients on
a 64-item Confabulation Battery ranged from 11–48%. The types of
confabulations elicited by our hypnotized subjects were provoked and






























March 13th when you were in Year 8?,” they replied with confabulations
such as “I sat in the playground with friends underneath a tree.” The
Confabulation Battery that we administered did not provide much
opportunity for bizarre confabulation (i.e., the questions involved mun-
dane, everyday events), yet some individuals produced unusual and
clearly incorrect memories. For example, a number of subjects com-
mented that they had not started university yet, which was clearly
incorrect because all subjects were university students.
Importantly, we demonstrated that the amnesia suggestion, com-
bined with a lack of awareness about the source of the amnesia, was
the most successful way to create confabulation in the laboratory. High
hypnotizable subjects confabulated the most in response to the amnesia
suggestion, less often for the fill-in-gaps suggestion, and rarely for
the temporal-confusion suggestion. Interestingly, the way that highs in
the amnesia condition confabulated was via temporal confusions. For
instance, 1 high in the amnesia condition reported during hypnosis
that her favorite current subject was business studies. However, dur-
ing the postexperimental inquiry she said, “I did business studies at
school! I had no idea I was at university. I don’t do business studies at
university!” So whereas an explicit temporal confusion suggestion was
unsuccessful, those who received the amnesia suggestion confused the
temporal order of the events they recalled.
We found also that confabulation was more common in response to
questions indexing personal semantic memory rather than questions
indexing episodic memory or “I don’t know” questions. This differ-
ence is not predicted by any of the theoretical views of confabulation,
since in clinical situations patients confabulate both about personal
facts (i.e., personal semantic information) and previous experiences
(i.e., episodic information). If our high hypnotizable subjects were con-
fabulating by transposing their high school lifetime period into the
present, they may have found it easier to transpose semantic informa-
tion as opposed to episodic events. For example, perhaps high school
episodes that involved different friendship groups or different hobbies
were too complex to transpose into the present day. This implies that
at some level, episodic confabulation may have been inhibited for our
high hypnotizable subjects, who preferred to not respond to episodic
questions.
It is interesting to note that the suggestion for amnesia alone (with-
out awareness of the source of the amnesia) was sufficient to produce
confabulation. We thought that perhaps the amnesia suggestion would
lead just to forgetting and that subjects would say they could not
remember the answers to questions about university. As noted in the
introduction, creating hypnotic confabulation via a Factor 1 sugges-
tion (e.g., amnesia) administered during hypnosis is quite different to
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are to be remembered (for a review, see McConkey et al., 1998). In the
present study, the Factor 1 amnesia suggestion combined with a Factor
2 evaluation impairment provided by the hypnotic context to produce
confabulation.
As noted above, our fill-in-gaps suggestion and temporal-confusion
suggestion were less successful in producing confabulation than our
amnesia suggestion. This may be because we attempted to impose
an explicit strategy on subjects that may have disrupted or interfered
with their natural strategy. Similar processes are thought to under-
lie explicit monitoring theories of choking under pressure where it
is argued that performance pressure makes individuals pay excessive
attention to skill processes that interferes with their ability to execute
a skill (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992). Also,
theories of retrieval disruption in collaborative inhibition suggest that
an individual’s natural memory retrieval strategies become disrupted
when they are exposed to the retrieval strategies of other group mem-
bers (B. H. Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997; D. R. Basden
& Basden, 1995). Perhaps the amnesia suggestion produced a gap in
memory and allowed subjects to fill this gap naturally, whereas the fill-
in-gaps and temporal-confusion suggestions inhibited confabulation by
enforcing a particular strategy. In work that has used hypnosis to model
mirrored-self misidentification delusion (the delusional belief that I see
a stranger when I look in the mirror), we found that a hypnotic sug-
gestion to see a mirror as a window with a view of a stranger was less
successful in producing the delusion (Barnier et al., 2008) than a sugges-
tion to simply not understand how mirrors work (Connors, Cox, et al.,
2012). That is, enforcing specific strategies or overprescribing what hyp-
notized subjects should do may be less effective than providing minimal
instructions and allowing subjects to interpret and act upon them in
their own way.
Laying aside these differences between suggestions, our results indi-
cate that the two-factor theory of delusions may also apply to clinical
confabulation (at least to those created temporarily via an amnesia sug-
gestion). Future work needs to confirm whether the hypnotic context is
indeed playing the role of Factor 2. According to Turner and Coltheart
(2010), under normal conditions, unconscious processes check memo-
ries for plausibility and tag any memories that require further conscious
checking. Factor 2 in confabulation might involve a failure of this check-
ing system to tag doubtful memories. A failure such as this would allow
source errors to occur because information from other sources (e.g.,
imagination) might not be tagged as doubtful and instead might be clas-
sified as a genuine previous experience. In support of this, Turner and
colleagues (2010) found that clinical confabulators make both source-
and reality-monitoring errors. Specifically, clinical confabulators cor-






























could not determine the source of this familiarity. These patients also
had difficulty discriminating imagined words from words that had been
read aloud by the experimenter. If confabulators are making source-
and reality-monitoring errors, it makes hypnosis an ideal technique
for modeling them in the laboratory because the hypnotic context can
disrupt these processes (Bryant & Mallard, 2005; Heaps & Nash, 2001;
McConkey, 2008) and may thus play the role of Factor 2.
One useful approach that can examine the role of hypnosis as Factor
2 involves giving some subjects a suggestion during hypnosis and
giving others the same suggestion without hypnosis. We applied this
technique to our research on hypnotic mirrored-self misidentification
where we gave subjects a Factor 1 suggestion that they would be unable
to recognize the face in the mirror (designed to model the proposal that
Factor 1 in this delusion is a face-processing deficit). We gave half of
our subjects this suggestion during hypnosis and gave the other half
the suggestion in their nonhypnotic state. Only subjects who received
the suggestion during hypnosis experienced the complete delusion and
said they saw a stranger in the mirror (Connors, Barnier, et al., 2012).
This suggests that hypnosis played the role of Factor 2 by disrupt-
ing belief evaluation and preventing the delusion from being rejected
as untrue. We can apply a similar technique to a hypnotic analogue
of confabulation by giving half of our subjects an amnesia suggestion
during hypnosis and the other half an amnesia suggestion without hyp-
nosis. We can then test the impact of Factor 1 and Factor 2 separately
and combined, which may offer insight into the role of these underlying
factors and/or may help refine particular theoretical viewpoints.
In summary, we have demonstrated that hypnosis can model some
types of provoked confabulation, similar to those seen in clinical con-
texts. In doing so, we have raised some useful questions for both the
modeler and the theorist about the nature and underlying processes
involved in confabulation. Using our hypnotic technique as a founda-
tion, we can trial modifications to increase the rate of confabulation,
to elicit more bizarre confabulations, or to produce confabulation for
episodic memories. If we can model clinical confabulation in this way,
we can next explore techniques to lessen conviction in these types of
memories, which may eventually be applied in clinical settings.
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Appendix
Confabulation Battery
Personal Semantic Memory Questions:
1.What high school did you go to?
2.Which year did you start university?
3.What subjects have you studied so far at university?
4.What were the names of some of your closest friends at high school?
5.Which teachers did you have during your final year of high school?
6.Which of the subjects that you are currently studying is your favorite?
Episodic Memory Questions:
1.Tell me about a school excursion you went on during high school?
2.How did you spend your first day at university?
3.What did you do after completing your final high school exams?
4.Can you tell me about the most interesting tutorial you have had so far at
university?
5.What did you do last Saturday?
6.Tell me about a birthday party you went to during high school?
“I don’t know” Questions:
1.What did you do on March 13th when you were in Year 8?
2.What did you have for dinner on the first Tuesday of August in your final
year of high school?
3.What did you do on Thursday in Week 3 of semester this year?
4.What did you do straight after waking up on April 3rd of this year?
5.What did you do during the Easter holidays when you were in Year 9?
6.What did you have for lunch on March 20th of this year?
Eine Hypnotische Analogie Klinischer Konfabulation
Rochelle E. Cox und Amanda J. Barnier
Abstrakt: Konfabulation, also erfundene oder veränderte Erinnerungen
einer Person von sich selbst, findet sich in vielen Erkrankungen. Doch
es gibt keine verlässliche Technik dafür, sie unter Laborbedingungen zu
messen. Die Autoren benutzen Hypnose, um klinische Konfabulation mit-
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beinhaltete eine Amnesie für alles was seit ihrem Start an der Universität
passiert war, eine andere eine Amnesie für die Universität und zusätzlich
eine Instruktion, die Gedächtnislücken zu füllen und eine dritte Variation
bestand in der Konfusion bezüglich der zeitlichen Abfolge universitärer
Ereignisse. Daraufhin wurden verschiedene Typen der Erinnerung mittels
der confabulation battery indiziert. Die Suggestion der Amnesie rief die
meisten Konfabulationen, und dabei vor allem solche in bezug auf persön-
liche semantische Informationen, hervor. Die Autoren diskutieren die the-
oretischen Implikationen dieses ersten Ansatzes, Konfabulationen klinisch
darstellbar zu machen, und die potentielle Nutzbarkeit solcher Analogien.
Stephanie Reigel, MD
Un analogue hypnotique de confabulation clinique
Rochelle E. Cox et Amanda J. Barnier
Résumé: La confabulation, soit la fabrication ou la déformation de sou-
venirs à propos de soi-même, est présente dans nombreux troubles psy-
chologiques, mais il n’existe pas de technique fiable pour procéder à son
investigation en laboratoire. Les auteurs ont utilisé l’hypnose pour mod-
éliser une confabulation clinique en donnant aux sujets l’une ou l’autre des
suggestions suivantes: 1) l’amnésie de tout ce qui s’était passé depuis leur
entrée à l’université; 2) l’amnésie liée à ce qui s’est passé à université en
y ajoutant une instruction pour combler les lacunes de leur mémoire; ou
3) une confusion quant à l’ordre chronologique de ces événements univer-
sitaires. Ils ont ensuite indexé différents types de mémoire à l’aide d’un test
de confabulation. La suggestion d’amnésie est celle ayant produit le plus de
confabulation, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à l’information sémantique
personnelle. La confabulation des sujets se caractérisait surtout par de la con-
fusion temporelle. Les auteurs ont abordé les implications théoriques de cette




Un análogo hipnótico de la confabulación clínica
Rochelle E. Cox y Amanda J. Barnier
Resumen: La confabulación –memorias fabricadas o distorsionadas sobre
uno mismo- ocurre en muchos trastornos, pero no existe alguna técnica fiable
para evaluarla en el laboratorio. Los autores utilizaron la hipnosis para mod-
elar la confabulación clínica al darle a los sujetos una sugerencia ya sea
de: (1) amnesia para todo lo ocurrido desde el comienzo de la universidad,
(2) amnesia para la universidad más la instrucción de llenar huecos en la
memoria, o (3) confusión sobre el orden temporal de eventos universitarios.
Después los sujetos indexaron distintos tipos de memoria en una batería de






























especialmente para información semántica personal. Notoriamente, los suje-
tos confabularon mediante la realización de confusiones temporales. Los
autores discuten las implicaciones teóricas del primer intento de modelar la
confabulación clínica y la utilidad potencial de estos análogos.
Omar Sánchez-Armáss Cappello, PhD
Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi,
Mexico
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